Many applications today rely on storage and management of semi-structured information, for example, XML databases and document-oriented databases. These data often have to be shared with untrusted third parties, which makes individuals' privacy a fundamental problem. In this article, we propose anonymization techniques for privacy-preserving publishing of hierarchical data. We show that the problem of anonymizing hierarchical data poses unique challenges that cannot be readily solved by existing mechanisms. We extend two standards for privacy protection in tabular data (k-anonymity and -diversity) and apply them to hierarchical data. We present utility-aware algorithms that enforce these definitions of privacy using generalizations and suppressions of data values. To evaluate our algorithms and their heuristics, we experiment on synthetic and real datasets obtained from two universities. Our experiments show that we significantly outperform related methods that provide comparable privacy guarantees.
INTRODUCTION
The ever-increasing ability to collect and store person-specific microdata has inevitably raised concerns over individuals' privacy. Data in today's world often comes in various complex structures and formats. In particular, hierarchical data has become ubiquitous with the advent of document-oriented databases following the NoSQL trend (e.g., MongoDB) and the popularity of markup languages for richly structured documents and objects (e.g., XML, JSON, YAML). Such data contain valuable information that can be harvested through data-mining techniques. However, proper de-identification Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, to redistribute to lists, or to use any component of this work in other works requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested from Publications Dept., ACM, Inc., 2 Penn Plaza, Suite 701, New York, NY 10121-0701 USA, fax +1 (212) 869-0481, or permissions@acm.org. and anonymization is needed before data are published, that is, shared with untrusted third parties.
The least one can do to protect privacy is to delete explicitly identifying information (e.g., SSN, name). However, it has been shown that this is ineffective: Sweeney [2000 Sweeney [ , 2002b report that a set of quasi-identifier (QI) attributes (e.g., gender, zipcode, date of birth) can uniquely identify the majority of a population and also lead to linkage attacks [Fung et al. 2010 ]. An adversary performs a linkage attack by knowing one or more QI values of his victim and trying to infer the victim's sensitive attribute (SA) (e.g., GPA, health condition) values.
Privacy in tabular data has been widely studied. A prominent method in data anonymization is k-anonymity, which states that each record in a k-anonymous dataset must be indistinguishable from k − 1 other records with respect to their QIs. Such QIwise equivalent groups are called equivalence classes (EC) . k-anonymity is a promising step towards privacy, but it is still susceptible to attacks [Machanavajjhala et al. 2007; Truta and Vinay 2006] . The main concern regarding k-anonymity is that it does not consider the distribution of sensitive attributes, for example, all individuals in an EC may have the same sensitive value. -diversity [Machanavajjhala et al. 2007 ] was proposed to address this problem and requires that sensitive values in each EC are well represented. To achieve this, given an EC we limit an adversary's probability of inferring a sensitive value by 1/ .
Two popular ways of achieving k-anonymity and -diversity are generalizations and suppressions. Generalizations replace specific values by more general ones, for example, course ID "CS305" can be replaced by "CS 3rd year" or "CS3**." Suppressions conceal information by deleting it: Records that exist in the original data are completely removed from the final output. Since we are working with records with complex structures, we will use not only removal of entire records (i.e., full suppressions) but also partial suppressions (i.e., pruning data records by removing vertices, edges and subtrees). Data perturbation and the addition of counterfeits (i.e., fake information) is beyond the scope of our anonymization strategy, since we would like the data publisher to remain truthful (i.e., all data in the output must have originated from the input and not be randomly spawned by the anonymization algorithm).
We motivate privacy-related attacks on hierarchical data using the example in Figure 1 . This record fits the hierarchical education schema given in Figure 2 . Student S, born in 1993 and majoring in Computer Science, took two courses: CS201 and CS306. For CS201, S submitted evaluations for two of his instructors. For CS306, S submitted one evaluation and also reported that he bought the Intro to Databases book. We say that all of this knowledge are QIs of S. Notice that we write QIs as labels of vertices. Knowing some or all of these QIs, the goal of the adversary is to learn sensitive information about S (e.g., GPA, letter grades S received from the two courses, his evaluation scores, etc.). Without anonymization, this could be trivial: If there is Organization. The remainder of this article is organized as follows: An overview of related work is given in Section 2. In Section 3, we formally define our data model and anonymization techniques and state related assumptions. Section 4 motivates our approach by explaining why -diversity is needed and why existing tabular -diversity methods are unable to ensure -diversity in hierarchical data. Section 5 proposes a novel anonymization algorithm based on clustering, with certain heuristics. We summarize our experiments and discuss our results in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 re-iterates the main points, briefly touches on future work, and concludes the article.
RELATED WORK
k-anonymity was proposed by Sweeney and Samarati and since then has become a standard for privacy protection [Samarati and Sweeney 1998; Sweeney 2002b] . It has been shown that optimal k-anonymity using generalizations and suppressions is NPhard [LeFevre et al. 2006; Meyerson and Williams 2004 ]. Yet, achieving practical and efficient k-anonymity on tabular data has been an active area of research [Bayardo and Agrawal 2005; Iyengar 2002; LeFevre et al. 2005; Nergiz et al. 2011; Sweeney 2002a] . The main concern regarding k-anonymity is that it does not consider the distribution of sensitive values [Truta and Vinay 2006] , and it is therefore susceptible to attribute linkage attacks [Fung et al. 2010] . In this article, we use -diversity [Machanavajjhala et al. 2007 ] that addresses this problem. In Xiao et al. [2010] , authors show that achieving optimal -diversity through generalizations is NP-hard for ≥ 3. Among notable -diversity algorithms are those in Liu and Wang [2010] , Machanavajjhala et al. [2007] , and Xiao et al. [2010] .
Privacy notions such as k-anonymity and -diversity were initially introduced for tabular data, but they are being extended and applied to various types of complex data. Here we describe the differences between our data model and those presented in earlier works in complex data anonymization. In Cheng et al. [2010] , Liu and Terzi [2008] , and Zheleva and Getoor [2008] , authors study variations of k-anonymity (e.g., k-isomorphism) to anonymize graph data. In graph data and social network anonymization ( [Zhou et al. 2008] ), data often come in the form of one large graph, and the goal is to make each vertex isomorphic or indistinguishable from k − 1 other vertices. On the other hand, our data model assumes one disjoint record per individual. Also, we presume an explicit hierarchy between vertices and do not allow cyclic graphs. In Ghinita et al. [2011] , He and Naughton [2009] , , and Terrovitis et al. [2011] , the authors investigate privacy-preserving publishing of transactional databases and set-valued data. Elements in set-valued data do not contain an order or a hierarchy, and all elements in a database originate from the same domain (e.g., market purchases, search logs). Our work considers multiple QI and sensitive attributes that each have a separate domain. Several studies (e.g., Cicek et al. [2014] , Nergiz et al. [2008] , and ) use generalizations and suppressions for privacy preservation in spatio-temporal and trajectory data publishing. A trajectory is an ordered set of points where each point has one immediate neighbor (i.e, a → b → c). Whereas in hierarchical data each vertex has multiple children that are potentially from different domains. Finally, some works such as Landberg et al. [2011] and Li et al. [2007] assume that the data are in tabular form, but the domains of sensitive attributes are hierarchically organized. They propose privacy definitions applicable to this particular scenario. However, we assume no ordering or hierarchy among sensitive values and instead propose that quasi-identifying information is organized hierarchically.
Several studies investigate privacy in semi-structured and hierarchical data from the point of view of access control. In particular, access control systems for XML documents have been designed and implemented for over a decade [Bertino et al. 2000; Damiani et al. 2002; Fundulaki and Marx 2004] . However, these are orthogonal to our approach: We assume that an adversary will have full knowledge over the database once it is published. In contrast, access control methods stop unauthorized users (such as adversaries) from gaining access to sensitive information in the data. Most closely related to our work are Gkountouna and Terrovitis [2015] , Landberg et al. [2014] , Nergiz et al. [2009] , and Yang and Li [2004] , who study privacy-preserving publishing of hierarchical or tree-structured data. Information regarding these works is given next and is also summarized in Table I . In Yang and Li [2004] , authors focus on cases where functional dependencies in XML data cause information leakage. They formulate such dependencies as XML constraints. They propose an algorithm that sanitizes XML documents according to these constraints so the resulting document no longer leaks information. Our adversarial model is broader: We study adversaries that also have background knowledge regarding their victims. In Landberg et al. [2014] , authors introduce two anonymization schemes for XML data: an extension of anatomy [Xiao and Tao 2006a] (another well-known privacy protection method) and δ-dependency. However, these methods transform the schema of XML documents by de-associating QIs and SAs. Also, they support generalizations of SAs, which intuitively work against our goal of making records -diverse. Concurrently with our study, Gkountouna and Terrovitis [2015] proposed the k (m,n) -anonymity definition for treestructured data. In their work, attackers' background knowledge is limited to m vertex labels and n structural relations between vertices (i.e., ancestor/descendant relationships). Also contrary to our approach, they support structural disassociations that modify the original schema of records. In addition, they employ a global recoding approach, that is, if a value is generalized, then all its appearances in the database must be replaced by the generalized value. This requirement can be too constraining for high-dimensional and sparse data, and therefore our solution uses local recoding that allows a value and its generalization to co-exist in the output. Furthermore, their solution is exponential in m. In Nergiz et al. [2009] , authors extend k-anonymity to anonymize multi-relational databases that have snowflake-shaped entity-relationship diagrams. Their definitions are primarily concerned with k-anonymity, and although they propose a method for -diversity, (1) their solution k-anonymizes the database first and then iteratively tries to find an output that is -diverse, and (2) they do not provide any experimental results. The effectiveness of their approach relies heavily on the k-anonymized database, which is obtained without taking SAs into account. On the other hand, our algorithm checks for -diversity at each anonymization step. 
PROBLEM FORMULATION

Data Model
In this section, we formally state our assumptions regarding the structure of our data and introduce our notation.
Definition 3.1 (Rooted Tree). Let T be a graph with n vertices. We say that T is a rooted tree if and only if:
(1) T is a directed acyclic graph with n − 1 edges. (2) One vertex is singled out as the root vertex, and there is a single path from the root vertex to every other vertex in T . We denote such trees by T (V, E), where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges in the tree.
Definition 3.2 (Hierarchical Data Record). We say that a hierarchical data record satisfies the following conditions:
(1) It follows a rooted tree structure. (3.81 ). An edge between two vertices signals that information is semantically linked, for example, the evaluation score of 9/10 for Prof. Saygin in Figure 1 was given by this particular student and for the CS306 course. Such links can be established through primary and foreign keys in a multi-relational SQL database or through hierarchical object representations in XML or JSON. Conversion of any type of hierarchical data to the structure defined above is trivial, given which attributes are quasi-identifiers and which ones are sensitive.
We say that an individual's record in the database conforms to the definition of a hierarchical data record, and only one hierarchical record exists per individual. The database is a collection F that contains n hierarchical records, denoted We use union-compatibility akin to database relations: Two database relations are union-compatible if they share the same number of attributes and each attribute is from the same domain. Similarly, in our case, two vertices are union-compatible if they follow the same schema (i.e., same QIs and SAs). 
Anonymization
Domain generalization hierarchies (DGH) are taxonomy trees that provide a hierarchical order and categorization of values. We assume that a DGH is either available or easily inferable for each QI. Note that this assumption is widely adopted in the anonymization literature [Fung et al. 2010; Nergiz et al. 2009] . Values observed in the database appear as the leaves of DGHs. The root vertices of DGHs contain "*" to mean "any value," that is, value completely hidden. A DGH is given for attribute course ID in Figure 3 . (1) v and v * are union-compatible.
In words, a vertex is generalized when at least one of its QI values gets replaced by a value that is more general according to the attribute's DGH. A vertex generalization leaves sensitive values intact.
In tabular data, suppression of a row refers to the removal of that row from the published dataset (or, equivalently, all values in that row are replaced by "*"). In our setting, this translates to completely removing an individual's hierarchical record. Although this might be necessary and we support this operation, its effect is also drastic: If the deleted record is large (i.e., contains a lot of vertices), then a lot of useful information might be lost. We therefore introduce partial suppressions. Definition 3.6 (Partial Suppression). We say that a hierarchical data record T * is a partially suppressed version of T , if T * is obtained from T by first removing exactly one edge from T (call this e) and then deleting all vertices and edges that are no longer accessible from the root of T (i.e., there is no longer a path from the root to them). We write T * = ϕ e (T ) to denote this operation.
Intuitively, a partial suppression is nothing but tree pruning. Such pruning can lead to the deletion of a single vertex or a subtree containing multiple vertices and edges. Note that the remainder of the data record is untouched, that is, vertices that "survive" the partial suppression operation incur no changes to their QIs or sensitive values. From Figures 4(a) to (c), the edge between the root and CS404 is broken, which leads to the suppression of a larger subtree (i.e., children of CS404 are also deleted). We explicitly replace suppressed vertices with dashed lines and lost information (both v QI and v SA ) with "*" for demonstration purposes. They are otherwise not part of the output.
Definition 3.7 ( -diversity). Let X = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n } be a multiset of values from the domain of a sensitive attribute A, that is,
Informally, this probabilistic -diversity definition states that the frequency of all sensitive values must be bounded by 1/ .
Sensitive attributes can be categorical (e.g., letter grade) or continuous (e.g., GPA). The domain of categorical SAs consists of discrete values (e.g., letter grades from A to F), and it is straightforward to evaluate -diversity on a set of discrete values as above. However, continuous SAs require an intermediate discretization step. The domain of a continuous SA is divided into non-overlapping buckets, and X then contains the buckets data values fall into. (For example, GPA domain [0.0 − 4.0] can be divided into eight buckets of size 0.5. A GPA value 3.26 can then translate to the bucket [3.0 − 3.50).) We do not enforce a specific discretization; instead, our algorithms can work with an arbitrary discretization that meets the demands and preferences of the data publisher. We also allow discretizations to contain buckets with different sizes.
Definition 3.8 (Diversity of Vertices). Let V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } be a set of vertices from hierarchical data records. We study two cases:
Then, V is -diverse if and only if all vertices in V are pairwise union compatible and X is -diverse.
Various metrics were proposed and used in relevant literature to calculate costs of anonymization [Bayardo and Agrawal 2005; Bertino et al. 2008; Iyengar 2002; Xiao and Tao 2006b] . In this article, we will use an extension of the general loss metric (LM) [Nergiz et al. 2011] . Similar extensions were previously applied in a number of settings, including medical health records [Tamersoy et al. 2012] and multi-relational databases [Nergiz et al. 2009 ].
Definition 3.9 (Individual LM Cost). Given a DGH for attribute A and a value x ∈ (A) (i.e., x exists in A's DGH), the individual LM cost of value x is
where r denotes the root of A's DGH.
Definition 3.10 (LM Cost of a Collection of Hierarchical Records). Let F and F
* be collections of hierarchical data records, where F * is obtained via anonymizing F. Let denote the set of vertices that exist in records in F but do not exist in F * due to partial or full suppressions of records. Then, the LM cost of F * is
These cost metrics measure the utility loss due to generalizations and suppressions. LM is defined on QI values and asserts a cost according to how general a QI value is. For example, according to Figure 3 , LM (CS) = 4/6, LM (CS2**) = 1/6, and LM (CS201) = 0. Intuitively, if the output contains CS instead of CS2** or CS201, there is higher ambiguity regarding the initial QI value that was generalized to CS. Hence, LM assigns a higher penalty to more general QIs.
We use LM to build LM(F * ), a cost metric that is suitable to our setting. In this definition, the anonymization cost is broken down into two factors: The first factor calculates the cost incurred by generalizations of vertices that appear in the published data. The second factor adds the cost of suppressions. The total cost is calculated on the order of labels rather than vertices or trees to better focus on each individual piece of data lost during anonymization.
One can verify that the LM cost of a QI is within the range [0, 1], where the root of a DGH receives the highest penalty (1) and leaves receive no penalty (0). Consequently, we ensure that LM(F * ) is also normalized to a value within [0, 1]. We compute the LM cost of anonymizing the two records in Figure 4 (c) to provide an example for LM(F * ). Assume that F consists of only the two records in Figure 4 (a), and F * is the records in Figure 4 (c). Further assume the LM costs of generalizing years of birth 1994 and 1995 to 199* is 1/10, course IDs CS306 and CS305 to CS3** is 1/3, instructors Prof. Saygin and Prof. Nergiz to DB Prof. is 2/7, and TA1 and TA2 to TA is 1/2. Then,
Problem Definition
Having established the preliminaries, in this section we formally define and state the problem. We start with an auxiliary definition regarding QI-isomorphism.
Definition 3.11 (QI-isomorphism). Let T 1 (V 1 , E 1 ) denote a hierarchical data record with a set of vertices V 1 and edges E 1 . A data record T 2 (V 2 , E 2 ) is QI-isomorphic to T 1 if and only if there exists a bijection f : V 1 → V 2 such that:
(1) For x, y ∈ V 1 , there exists an edge e i ∈ E 2 from f (x) to f (y) if and only if there exists an edge e j ∈ E 1 from x to y. (2) The root vertex is conserved; that is, denoting the root of the first tree as r 1 ∈ V 1 and the root of the second tree as r 2 ∈ V 2 , f (r 1 ) = r 2 . (3) For all pairs (x, x ), where x ∈ V 1 and x = f (x), x and x are union-compatible and
Definition 3.12 (Equivalence Class of Hierarchical Records). We say that records D = {T 1 , . . . , T k } are k-anonymous and form an equivalence class if, for all i, j where
Two records are QI-isomorphic if they appear to be completely same when all sensitive values are deleted from both. In other words, they are indistinguishable in terms of labels and structure. There is a clear analogy between the traditional definition of equivalence classes in tabular k-anonymity and our definition for hierarchical records: Both state that an equivalence class is a set of records that are indistinguishable with respect to their QIs.
Definition 3.13 ( -diverse Equivalence Class). We say that records {T 1 , . . . , T k } form an -diverse equivalence class, if and only if:
-diversity proposes the following extension to k-anonymity: Given a set of kanonymous records, we are certain that they are pairwise QI-isomorphic, and it is possible to generate a set of bijections { f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f k−1 } to match their vertices that are equivalent in terms of structure and QIs. Matching vertices should be -diverse (i.e., Definition 3.8) so, for every piece of QI or structure-wise knowledge, the corresponding vertices yield a sensitive value with probability no more than 1/ .
We should point out that multiple bijections between two records' vertices are possible if they contain multiple union-compatible sibling vertices with identical QIs. In such cases, it is too restrictive to require that all possible bijections satisfy -diversity; therefore, our definition states that it would suffice to have one bijection that does. Figure 4 contains two records together with their 2-anonymous and 2-diverse versions. This is just one way of anonymizing these records; there are also other correct (i.e., fitting the definition of anonymity and diversity) anonymizations. The quality of these anonymizations, however, depend on how much information is lost (according to an appropriate cost metric). An anonymization that satisfies k-anonymity or -diversity and yields the lowest information loss is most desirable.
An alternative representation of an equivalence class that we use in later sections is the class representative for a given equivalence class. A class representative T is essentially a hierarchical data record with one extension: If a vertex contains a sensitive attribute, then its value is not a single element but rather a list of elements.
(∀v ∈ T , v SA returns a set rather than a single sensitive value.) We formally define class representative as follows: representative for D if T is QI-isomorphic to T 1 with a bijection function f and ∀v ∈ T , It is easy to show that a given equivalence class is -diverse if and only if the corresponding representative is -diverse, that is, ∀v ∈ T , the set v SA satisfies -diversity.
Definition 3.15 ( -diversity of a Database). A collection of records
* belongs to exactly one j -diverse equivalence class, and for all j , j ≥ holds.
We now discuss why we require every record T * i to belong to exactly one j -diverse equivalence class. If T * i does not belong to exactly one j -diverse equivalence class, then it either belongs to less than one j -diverse equivalence class or multiple equivalence classes. Say that T * i does not belong to an j -diverse equivalence class where j ≥ . That is, T * i belongs to a t-diverse equivalence class where t < . Then, clearly, it is possible, with certain background knowledge, that an adversary will be able to infer the sensitive attribute in T * i with probability 1/t, which is greater than 1/ . This defeats the purpose of -diversity and the privacy protection we offer in this article. On the other hand, say that T * i belongs to multiple equivalence classes that are j -diverse. We construct an example to demonstrate the privacy breach here: Let T 1 , T 2 , and T 3 be three records that each contain a single vertex, be 2, and T 1 -T 2 and T 2 -T 3 be the two equivalence classes (notice that T 2 appears in both equivalence classes). Since T 1 -T 2 and T 2 -T 3 constitute equivalence classes, due to QI-isomorphism, we know that they have the same QIs. Say that an adversary has knowledge of these QIs and tries to infer a sensitive attribute. If T 1 and T 3 have the same sensitive value (and T 2 has a different sensitive value), then the probability of an adversary inferring a sensitive value is 2/3, which is greater than 1/2 (1/ ). Whereas if T 2 was not part of both equivalence classes (e.g., T 1 -T 2 was an equivalence class, and there was a fourth record T 4 , where T 3 -T 4 was an equivalence class), then the probability of inference would be at most 2/4, even if all four records had the same QIs. 2/4 = 1/2 (i.e., 1/ ), hence there would be no privacy breach.
Given a collection of hierarchical data records F(T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T n ), an anonymized output F * is generated via the following principle: For each record T i ∈ F, either T i is fully suppressed and does not appear in F * , or T i is transformed into T * i ∈ F * by performing a set of generalizations { } and partial suppressions {ϕ e (T i )}. With these definitions in mind, the problem we study in this article can be stated as follows: Given a set of hierarchical data records F, we would like to compute an -diverse output F * with minimal information loss, using the anonymization principle above.
MOTIVATION
Given our definitions of privacy, two natural questions to ask are "Why -diversity?" and "Why does one need new algorithms to enforce -diversity on hierarchical data?" In this section, we aim to provide answers to these two questions.
-Diversity vs. k-Anonymity in Hierarchical Data
Prior approaches in hierarchical (and tree-structured) data anonymization against linkage attacks can be divided into two camps: providing privacy by disassociating QIs and SAs [Landberg et al. 2014 ] and extensions of k-anonymity (e.g., multi-relational k-anonymity [Nergiz et al. 2009 ] and k (m,n) -anonymity [Gkountouna and Terrovitis 2015] ). The former publishes QI values and SA values separately, hence an adversary cannot determine the sensitive value of a particular vertex (e.g., the letter grade S received from course CS201). In the latter, records are anonymized in terms of structure and labels (QIs in our case), but sensitive values are left unattended. (In particular, Gkountouna and Terrovitis [2015] has no distinction between QI and SA.) Both may result in equivalence classes that leak sensitive values with significant probabilities.
Let us demonstrate the plausibility of homogeneity and background knowledge attacks on hierarchical data, where data are k-anonymized according to Nergiz et al. [2009] or Gkountouna and Terrovitis [2015] . Say that a 2-anonymous dataset has been published, such as the one in Figure 4 (b). Let the adversary know beforehand that there will be at most two students that majored in Computer Science and were born in the 1990s. His victim S is among these two students. The adversary links S to the records in Figure 4 (b). At this point, the published dataset leaks the following pieces of information: (1) S received an A-from CS404. (2) S submitted an evaluation score of 8 for Prof. Levi in CS201. The peculiarity of this example comes from the fact that the adversary had no knowledge of QI values for the vertices that leaked these information (e.g., the adversary did not know that S evaluated Prof. Levi). Both of these privacy leaks could have been avoided if the published data was 2-diverse as in Figure 4 (c).
-Diversity in Tabular vs Hierarchical Data
As reported earlier, several algorithms that apply -diversity to tabular data have been implemented. In applicable situations, one way of processing hierarchical data is to reduce it to tabular data and then run tabular algorithms on it. There are also arguments that say, in most scenarios, that converting hierarchical data to a single giant relation and then using single-table algorithms is undesirable because of potential loss of information and semantic links between data records [Han et al. 2011 ]. We now demonstrate that such conversions and reductions are not sufficient also for privacy protection.
4.2.1. Anonymizing Relations Separately. A hierarchical schema (e.g., Figure 2 ) can be represented using multiple database relations that are linked via primary and foreign keys (i.e., join keys). Then, a straightforward approach would be to consider each relation independently and run tabular -diversity algorithms on them.
Consider the two tables in Figure 6 , where studentIDs are added and used as join keys. When these two tables are treated independently, a resulting anonymization could be the one in Figure 7 . It can easily be verified that both tables are 2-diverse by themselves. Converting the result into our hierarchical representation, though, we see that students S1 and S2 are neither 2-anonymous nor 2-diverse. An adversary that knows S1 took CS201 learns the GPA of S1, since S2 has not taken any CS200-series courses.
The main problem of this independent anonymization approach is that anonymizations are not guaranteed to be consistent between multiple tables. In the first table, S1 Fig. 6 . Students S1 and S2 and their courses as two tables linked using studentIDs (primary key in Table I , foreign key in Table 2 ). and S2's tuples are anonymized with respect to each other, but a tabular anonymization algorithm does not acknowledge this when anonymizing the second table. Hence, S1's tuples may be bundled together, and S2's tuples may be bundled together while creating a 2-diverse version of the second table.
Constructing and Anonymizing a Universal Relation.
Another approach is to flatten hierarchical data into one big relation called the universal relation, that is, the universal relation is obtained by joining all relations in a hierarchical schema using join keys. Figure 8 provides a sample universal relation. Notice that this creates a significant amount of redundancy and undesirable dependencies. Information in deeper vertices of the records have to be rewritten for each descendant connected to that vertex (e.g., QIs major and year of birth are repeated for each course taken). A second problem is that leaf vertices may be at different depths, which will force work-arounds such as having null values in the universal relation. For example, in Figure 8 , if S3 had not taken any courses, we would either have to remove him from the universal relation or enter nulls for his course and grade. Here we show the ineffectiveness of the universal relation approach even ignoring the problems discussed up to this point. The table in Figure 9 is 2-diverse in terms of the two sensitive attributes, GPA and grade. However, the hierarchical records of S3, S4, and S5 are not anonymous: S3 and S5 are shown having taken one CS3** course each, but S4 has taken two. An adversary that knows S4 is the only student who has enrolled in more than one CS3** course can learn the grades S4 received from these courses, together with S4's GPA. The problem this time arises from the fact that each individual may have an unknown number of entries in the universal relation.
ANONYMIZATION ALGORITHM
We designed and implemented a solution to the anonymization problem stated at the end of Section 3. Before moving forward, we would like to underline two important characteristics of our anonymization scheme. First, our approach ensures that the data publisher remains truthful. The output does not contain any information that did not exist originally in the input, that is, we do not consider adding new vertices, changing QIs of vertices (other than generalizing them), or adding new QIs or SAs to existing vertices. Second, vertices that appear in the output have the same depth, adjacency, and parent as they did in the input. That is, the structure of records in the output are consistent with the input. This schema preservation enables easier data mining without any ambiguity.
We present our algorithm in two steps: (1) Given two records, we focus on how to anonymize them with respect to each other so they become 2-diverse with low information loss. (2) We build a clustering algorithm that employs the previous step and class representatives to anonymize an arbitrary number of records.
Pairwise Anonymization
Converting two records to a 2-diverse pair is pivotal not only because we use it as a building block in our clustering algorithm, but also because we employ it as a similarity metric (i.e., to calculate distance between two hierarchical data records). In addition, given a fixed pair of records as inputs, the anonymization function should be able to produce a 2-diverse output with as little information loss as possible. Therefore, it relies on finding vertices and subtrees that are similar in both records.
We define the following notation: Let root(T ) denote the root vertex of the hierarchical data record T and subtrees(v) denote the subtrees rooted at the children of v (i.e., for each child c i of v, the hierarchical data record rooted at c i is included in subtrees(v)). Given two QI values X and Y both from the same QI domain, and Z that is the DGH of the QI, we say that function mrca(X, Y, Z) returns the lowest (i.e., most recent) common ancestor of X and Y according to Z. Assume that the function cost(T ) returns the cost of anonymization of T , given a pre-defined cost metric CM. An applicable cost metric is LM, and, in that case, the cost of a record T is
where V denotes the vertices in T that are not suppressed and denotes the vertices that were in T but are now suppressed. Let clone(T ) return a copy of T . Furthermore, given two vertices a and b, let u-comp(a, b) return cost(T 1 ) + cost(T 2 )
7: let E be the set of outgoing edges from b
15:
for e ∈ E do 16: for v ∈ subtrees(b) and ∃(x, v) ∈ P for some x do
22:
Let e be the edge from b to v 23:
24:
A function that anonymizes hierarchical records in a top-down manner is presented in Algorithm 1. We refer to this function as diversify. Without loss of generality, we assume that for the two input hierarchical records T 1 and T 2 (rooted at a and b, respectively), |children(a)| ≤ |children(b)|. (Otherwise, T 1 and T 2 can be interchanged as the first step.) The algorithm can be studied in several steps. First, we step check the union compatibility and diversity of root vertices a and b. If a and b cannot be anonymized, then their trees are suppressed. In the second step (lines 7-10), we generalize the QIs of a and b according to their DGHs. The resulting a and b will be indistinguishable in terms of QIs. In step 3 (lines 11-17), the algorithm checks if further calculation is needed: If a and b both have children, then we need to find a low-cost anonymization of their subtrees. If one does not have any children, then we can safely suppress the children and subtrees of the other. (Otherwise, it would be impossible to achieve QIisomorphism due to structural difference.) When the algorithm reaches line 18, it has dealt with the current level (i.e., checked if root vertices are diverse, anonymized them, and ensured that both have children). A low-cost pairing (i.e., mapping) between the subtrees rooted at a's children and the subtrees rooted at b's children is returned by the function FindMapping. (We will give a detailed explanation of how the mapping is computed in the next section.) Pairs returned by the function are suitable candidates to be anonymized with one another. Hence, diversify is run recursively on each pair (lines 19 and 20). Since we assumed |children(a)| ≤ |children(b)|, all subtrees rooted at a's children will be paired, but some subtrees rooted at b's children might be left-overs (i.e., they remain unpaired). Unpaired subtrees are suppressed (lines 21-23) to achieve QI-isomorphism of T 1 and T 2 . Finally, a successful execution of diversify always returns the cost of anonymizing its inputs (see the return statements throughout).
Finding a Good Mapping
Recall that FindMapping is called using two lists of hierarchical data records S and U (where |S| ≤ |U |), and the goal is to produce a set of pairs {(s, u) | s ∈ S, u ∈ U } that are similar. We measure similarity as the cost of anonymization. Finding an optimal solution to this problem requires finding all mappings between all elements in S and U and picking the mapping that yields the lowest cost. However, this is infeasible: Let S have n elements and U have m elements, where m ≥ n. The number of possible pairings between S and U is m n · n!, which implies exponential complexity. This becomes a significant problem when the branching factor of input data records is large. (Even for toy datasets with average branching factors of 6 to 7, optimal search took several hours.) We, therefore, need heuristic strategies for FindMapping. Based on this observation, we now describe two different solutions to the problem: one that employs a greedy algorithm, and another that models the problem as an optimization problem using linear programming. The greedy algorithm. This heuristic traverses S by picking one element at a time and finds the most suitable candidate in U to pair the element with. A more formal description is given in Algorithm 2. The greedy solution has no guarantees of finding a global optimum but instead settles for a local optimum in each iteration (i.e., for each element in S).
The procedure in Algorithm 2 works as follows: We pick one record at a time from the first set S and call this record f (line 3). Then, we consider each unpaired element v in the second set U and compute the information loss of anonymizing f with v (lines 6-10). This is done by first making copies of f and v (to make explicit that we do not modify the original records) and then running diversify on them. The record that yields the lowest cost wins and gets to pair up with f (lines 10-14). We repeat this procedure until S is exhausted.
An interesting heuristic is to find a strategy to choose f from S in a way such that Algorithm 2 performs better. In other words, can the order in which f is chosen from S affect the final outcome? We tried several heuristics for this, for example, based on the frequencies of the vertices and QIs. However, our results were not consistent. One strategy performed better in some occasions but worse in others. Also, the increase or decrease in the utility of the outputs were negligible. Thus, we refrain from building a strategy on top of greedy mapping but instead propose the approach described next. Reduction to an assignment problem. We propose a second strategy for FindMapping: We model the problem in hand as a linear sum assignment problem (LSAP). LSAP match ← v 13:
14:
return P is a famous linear programming and optimization problem [Munkres 1957 ], where one has n agents that need to be assigned to n tasks. Assigning an agent to a task has a certain cost that depends on the task and the agent performing it. The goal is to find an assignment such that all tasks are performed by assigning one agent to each task, one task to each agent, and the total cost of the assignment (i.e., linear sum of task-agent pairs selected) is minimized. More formally, given an n × n cost matrix C = (c ij ) and a binary variable x ij representing the assignment of agent i to task j, a LSAP can be modeled as
Subject to:
We use the Hungarian algorithm [Kuhn 1955 ] to solve an LSAP, which finds an optimal (i.e., lowest-cost) solution to the problem above in O(n 3 ) time. The solution is a collection of x ij s that tell which agent is assigned to which task.
We now explain how we use LSAPs in FindMapping. The process is shown in Algorithm 3. Given two lists of records S and U , we treat the records in S as agents and the records in U as tasks in a LSAP. We calculate the cost of an agent-task pair by running diversify on them, which computes the information loss incurred for anonymizing that pair (lines 3-7). This fills the uppermost |S| rows of the cost matrix with non-negative numbers. In many cases, we have |S| < |U | (i.e., number of agents and tasks differ), and hence the LSAP is unbalanced [Pentico 2007] . In these cases, we add dummy suppression agents to the cost matrix (lowermost |U | − |S| rows) to mark unmatched elements in |U | that will eventually be suppressed by diversify. We capture the costs of suppressing elements in U on lines 8-10. The cost method in Section 5.1 can be used Initialize |U | × |U | cost matrix C 3:
for i = 1 to |S| do 4:
c ij ← diversify ( f , v ) 8:
for i = |S| + 1 to |U | do 9:
for j = 1 to |U | do 10:
X ← solve the LSAP with cost matrix C 12:
for each x ij ∈ X do 14:
if x ij = 1 and i ≤ |S| then 15:
return P for this, and, in that case, the cost of suppressing a subtree is equal to the total number of data entries (i.e., QIs) that are deleted from that subtree. On line 11, we solve the LSAP using the Hungarian algorithm and, consequently, use this solution to compute the matching pairs of records in S and U that should be returned by FindMapping, while removing all dummy assignments (lines 13-15).
Clustering
Now that we can make a pair of records 2-diverse, we need to extend our strategy to support > 2. We do so using a clustering algorithm. Let c denote a cluster. Each cluster contains:
-A class representative, denoted c rep . This is a summary data structure that depicts the current state of the cluster. A formal definition of class representatives was given in Definition 3.14. -A set of data records, denoted c init , that are the original (i.e., unmodified) versions of the records in the cluster.
We first explain how we initialize and build one cluster. The procedure for this is given in Algorithm 4. Essentially, we treat a cluster as an equivalence class and use a clustering algorithm to build -diverse equivalence classes. A cluster is initialized using one record, and, at that point, it is a 1-diverse equivalence class. Then, we iteratively add new records to a cluster one by one, and each record that joins a t-diverse cluster makes it (t + 1)-diverse. The process is terminated when the cluster becomes -diverse. In Algorithm 4, a cluster c is initialized using one record on line 3. In order to satisfy -diversity, c needs to recruit − 1 other records; hence, the loop on line 4. While recruiting new records, instead of randomly adding records to c, we aim to find the most suitable record in our database F for c. That is, we find T b in F such that diversify(c rep , T b ) would return the lowest cost (line 5). Once this record is found, it is removed from F and added to c (lines 6 and 7). Then, c rep is updated on line 8: Generalizations and suppressions are performed, and sensitive values in T b 's vertices are added to matching vertices in c rep .
We present our main clustering procedure in Algorithm 5 and refer to it as ClusTree. It receives a database of hierarchical data records F, a privacy parameter , and two Based on the quality of the clusters that are built, ClusTree either accepts or rejects them. Next, we describe the details of this procedure.
ClusTree picks a T a from the input F (line 5) and uses it to create a new cluster using CreateCluster (line 9). Once a cluster is formed, its total anonymization cost is calculated (lines 10-12), where the total cost is the sum of individual anonymization costs of all records within that cluster. At this point, we introduce our clustering heuristic. We suggest that the quality of a cluster (implied by its cost) depends significantly on the choice of initial record T a . If T a happens to be an outlier (e.g., has far less or higher number of vertices than every other record in F, or its QIs are very rare), then even the best T b s joining T a 's cluster will incur high costs of anonymization. Therefore, on lines 13-22 of ClusTree, we perform the following check: We compute the mean and standard deviation of previously formed clusters (lines 14 and 15). If the cost of the newly formed cluster c is significantly higher than the mean, then it is discarded and all records in c are inserted back to the input F. Otherwise, c can be added to the output R. We use χ to limit the discrepancy between the cost of c and the mean cost of clusters in R (line 16). χ is initialized to 0 (line 3) and incremented by the step size parameter s (line 25) at each iteration. We run iterations of the clustering procedure until χ goes above m (line 26), and afterwards we run one final pass with χ = +∞ (line 27) to allow clusters with any cost. The output of the clustering algorithm is a set of -diverse clusters. Records in F that are not placed in any cluster in R are fully suppressed (lines 6-8). ClusTree terminates when less than records remain in the input F (lines 6-8 and 23 and 24).
A lower value of χ sets a stricter upper bound on the costs of accepted clusters. The rate at which χ increases is determined by the input clustering parameter s. s should be small enough that expensive clusters are rejected in the first few iterations but also large enough that clusters that were rejected in the previous iteration have a chance of being accepted in the next iteration. Also, smaller s implies larger number of passes over the input database F (although F is consumed in each iteration) and would hence be more time-consuming. The upper limit parameter m can be determined by experiment. However, if one assumes that clusters' costs will approximately follow a uniform distribution, the probability of a value falling outside μ+3·σ is significantly small (e.g., 99.7% of the samples in a normal distribution lie within 3 standard deviations of the mean). So, even in cases where costs are skewed or randomly distributed, a maximum upper limit of m = 3 or m = 4 should be reasonable. 
Complexity Analysis
In this section, we analyze the time complexity of our solution. We start with pairwise anonymization using diversify and FindMapping. Let our hierarchical data records have branching factor (number of children at each vertex) b ≥ 2 and height (number of edges on the longest path between the root vertex and a leaf) h. For the sake of simplicity, we'll assume that all mrca operations, vertex generalizations, and partial and full suppressions are performed in total time t per diversify call.
The greedy version of FindMapping requires
calls to diversify when called with two sets of subtrees. To anonymize all pairs of matched subtrees, diversify makes b recursive calls (lines 19 and 20 of Algorithm 1). Hence, we obtain the following recurrence relation: 2 diversify calls to fill its cost matrix with agent-task costs (lines 3-7 in Algorithm 3), when called with two sets of subtrees. Then, finding an optimal solution to the LSAP using the Hungarian algorithm is O(b 3 ). Similarly to that above, diversify still makes b recursive calls to anonymize all pairs of matched subtrees. In this case, we obtain the following recurrence relation:
, where T (0) = t. Solving this relation, we find that
These results are significant in several ways. First, pairwise anonymization is exponential in h. Practical databases in the real world, however, often have small h, for example, h = 3, 4. Therefore, this is not a pressing concern. Second, finding an optimal solution to a LSAP comes at the price of introducing an additional O(b 2h+1 ) factor in asymptotic complexity. Third, there is the cost of performing generalizations and suppressions, which we denote by t. The efficiency of these operations is dependent on their implementation. Some operations can be implemented in constant time (e.g., checking if two vertices are 2-diverse, suppressing a given subtree). In our experiments we saw that the factor t has significant impact on execution time; hence, efficient implementation of generalizations and suppressions is key to scalability.
The complexity analysis of our clustering algorithm ClusTree is as follows: Let n be the number of hierarchical data records in the database, be the -diversity parameter, and m and s be the clustering parameters in ClusTree. The complexity of pairwise anonymization depends on whether GRD or LSAP mapping is used, as shown above. We denote it here by O(diversify). We provide a worst-case analysis. The worst case occurs when the first cluster created is the least costly cluster possible, and therefore no cluster is accepted afterwards until the final iteration.
After initializing a cluster with a record, ClusTree (Algorithm 5) tries finding − 1 other records to join that cluster (Algorithm 4). This requires going over the remaining records in the database − 1 times and calling diversify. Hence, CreateCluster is O(n· · diversify). Calculating a cluster's cost (lines 10-12) can be done cumulatively within CreateCluster while the cluster is being formed, and there are online algorithms to compute mean and variance [Welford 1962 ] so computing and updating them when a new cluster is formed can be a constant time operation (lines 13-22). We therefore find that a single pass of ClusTree over its input database is O(n 2 · · diversify). A quick calculation shows that ClusTree performs + 2) · n 2 · · diversify).
Proofs of Correctness
We now prove the correctness of the algorithm ClusTree (given in Algorithm 5), that is, we prove that the output of the algorithm is an -diverse anonymization of F. To do this, we first prove the correctness of the algorithm diversify (given in Algorithm 1) which acts as a building block in ClusTree. 
PROOF. By induction:
Base Case: If the height of T 1 is 0, that is, then T 1 is ∅, T 2 is suppressed. Since we will not have any vertex in T * , T * is a valid anonymization of both T 1 and T 2 and satisfies ( 1 + 2 ) -diversity.
Inductive
Step: Let us denote a data record with height k as T h=k . By inductive hypothesis, we assume diversify runs correctly for records with height at most k − 1. That is, diversify on 1 -diverse T We proceed with the proof as follows. We first show that the roots are properly diversified, that is, generalized to a ( 1 + 2 ) -diverse representative vertex (or suppressed if diversification is not possible). We then show that the children of both trees are properly mapped, paired, and diversified. PROOF. The ClusTree algorithm is basically a loop where at each iteration the following is performed:
-At lines 5-22, ClusTree scans all records currently in F once and for each record, the function CreateCluster creates a single -diverse cluster. Between lines 16-28, if the quality of the previously-formed cluster is far away from normal parameters, then the cluster is discarded. Otherwise, it is moved from F to the result list. The distance threshold on the quality is controlled by the parameter χ . -χ is incremented, and, after reaching m, it is set as ∞.
The algorithm halts only when there are less than records not clustered, in which case these records are suppressed. Due to correctness of CreateCluster, if the algorithm terminates, then every record in F (except the few suppressed ones) belongs to exactly one cluster (equivalence class). Thus, by Definition 3.15, the returned clusters and the corresponding equivalence classes give an -diverse anonymization of the original records.
We conclude by stating that the algorithm always halts; that is, we will eventually have |F| < . Note that the distance threshold χ that decides whether to discard a previously formed cluster is monotonically increasing with each iteration of the while loop. After reaching m, χ is set to ∞. When this happens, no cluster will be discarded, thus every cluster formed by CreateCluster function is removed from F. Since CreateCluster is called on every record in T a , we will eventually be left with few-enough records in F and the algorithm returns.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We implemented our algorithms in Java (v1.8.0) and used MongoDB (v2.4.7) to store our datasets. Experiments were conducted on a commodity machine with Intel i7 2.40GHz CPU and 16GB RAM.
Evaluation metrics. We use three means of evaluation: LM cost, average query accuracy, and KL-divergence. LM outputs a numerical value between 0 and 1 that conveys the average cost of generalizations and suppressions over the whole database. Lower LM cost implies higher data utility and therefore preferable anonymization.
For measuring query accuracy, we randomly generate several aggregate count queries (e.g., "How many students took CS301?" or "How many CS courses were taken in total?"). We issue these queries on the original dataset (X i denotes the result of the ith query) and the anonymized dataset (Y i denotes the result of the ith query). Then, average query accuracy is computed as follows (where N is the total number of queries):
As a third metric, we employ the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence, in short) as follows: We find the distribution of sensitive values in the original and anonymized dataset. Let us call these probability distributions Q and P, respectively. For example, the distribution of letter grades in the original dataset could be 20% A, 25% A-, and so on, but, due to suppressions, this distribution may change to 25% A, 15% A-, and so on, in the anonymized dataset. The KL-divergence of Q from P is defined as MacKay [2003] :
A smaller KL-divergence implies that P and Q are closer to one another, and hence the statistical properties of the data are better preserved after anonymization. Thus, similarly to LM cost, it is more desirable to have smaller KL-divergence. We measure the KL-divergence of all sensitive values (e.g., GPA, letter grades, and book prices) one by one and report the average. Since generalizations do not affect sensitive values, only suppressions cause changes in their distribution. Therefore, KL-divergence is a good way to evaluate the effect of suppressions on the statistical properties of a dataset.
Datasets.
We report results on three datasets (two synthetic and one real) obtained from two different universities in Turkey. Both datasets share a similar schema to that in Figure 2 .
For the synthetic datasets, we obtained data regarding students from Sabanci University's Computer Science (CS) program. The data contained the GPA and (partial) course grades of 30 students from this year's graduating class. To test with a meaningful number of data records, we simulated several students based on this sample, with the guidelines explained in the next paragraph.
We assumed that approximately the same number of students graduate every year, and set their current age according to their year of graduation. We simulated GPA values using a normal distribution, where the mean and the standard deviation were determined by the GPA scores of our sample. According to Sabanci University's CS program requirements, we ensured that all students took the obligatory courses. To each student, we randomly assigned a fixed number of courses from the pool of core courses and a varying number of technical area electives. Students' grades were determined by their GPA and the type of course (e.g., we observed that most students perform better in obligatory courses). We assumed that a student would buy 0 to 2 books for each course.
We created two synthetic datasets, syntheticT and syntheticS, both containing 1,000 students with approximately 20 courses per student. syntheticS uses the schema in Figure 2 , that is, (major,YoB) → courses → books. In order to test with an increased height, in syntheticT we added an intermediate level between the root and the courses that depicts the year in which courses were taken, that is, freshman, sophomore, junior, or senior. Therefore the schema in syntheticT is as follows: (major,YoB) → college years → courses → books. The division of courses into college years was probabilistic based on whether the course is a pre-requisite for any of the other courses the student took and the usual timeframe in which the course is actually taken at Sabanci University.
The real dataset contains 3,162 students together with their years of birth, their GPA, the courses they took, and the grades they received. So, records in this dataset have only the first two levels shown in Figure 2 . Furthermore, instead of the QI attribute age, we used year of birth. We set DGHs of courses according to their IDs.
Algorithms. We evaluate five approaches, four of which are presented in this article. For these, we used the LM metric as the anonymization cost metric in Algorithm 1. We tested ClusTree with the greedy and LSAP-based implementations of FindMapping. We call the resulting methods ClusTree-GRD and ClusTree-LSAP, respectively. Regarding the parameters of ClusTree, we set s = 0.5, since we saw that values below 0.5 did not make an observable difference, and we obtained the best results with m = 4.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our clustering heuristic, we implemented a second procedure that does not contain any checks regarding the costs of clusters, that is, we initialize χ = +∞ on line 3 of Algorithm 5. We refer to this implementation as CToff . There are also two versions of CToff : CToff-GRD and CToff-LSAP, depending on whether FindMapping is greedy or LSAP based.
In addition, we implemented the multi-relational k-anonymity algorithm together with its -diversity extension (dMiRaCle) proposed in Nergiz et al. [2009] . To the best of our knowledge, this is the only algorithm that can provide similar privacy guarantees to ours (i.e., -diversity) in hierarchical data. We converted our datasets into multi-relational databases and ran dMiRaCle on them. There are two parameters in dMiRaCle: climit (a limit on the number of active clusters allowed during the algorithm) and th (a distance threshold parameter used in dMiRaCle's clustering phase). In our tests, we exactly mimicked the parameters suggested by the authors: We set climit to be 150 and tested with th ∈ [0, 1] with increments of 0.1, and picked the best-performing result to report in this article.
Results and Discussion. We graph our results for varying values of in Figure 10 , Figure 11 , and Figure 12 on the synthetic datasets and the real dataset, respectively. In all experiments, we observe that LM cost and KL-divergence increase and query accuracy decreases as privacy requirements get stricter, that is, is increased from 2 to 5. Two factors contribute to the loss of data utility when is increased: (1) The anonymization algorithm needs to find records for each cluster, that is, higher requires more records per cluster. Each record that joins a cluster causes generalizations and/or suppressions. These anonymization operations are never reverted at a later point (e.g., when a new record joins a cluster), and therefore the cost of a cluster always accumulates. (2) For large values of , it is harder to find different sensitive values per vertex. Consider a case where the instructor of CS306 decided to grade very generously and all students received either A or A-from this course. When = 3, CS306 courses may never be matched with each other simply because there are only two different grades observed in the database. Hence, either all occurrences of CS306 have to be suppressed, or they will be generalized with other courses (e.g., CS3** courses would be the best candidates) so they become 3-diverse in the output.
We also observe that our algorithm outperforms dMiRaCle by a great margin in every experiment. As explained in Section 2, Nergiz et al. [2009] 's dMiRaCle is primarily concerned with k-anonymity, and its -diversity extension depends on k-anonymizing an input dataset first and then finding an -diverse output. This can be a reasonable strategy when is small (e.g., = 2), since a 2-anonymous equivalence class can, by coincidence, happen to be 2-diverse (or making it 2-diverse might require very few operations). However, when = 3 or 4, if the initial equivalence class is not built with -diversity in mind, later operations to make it -diverse will be very costly. Our experiments demonstrate this: There is a sharp increase in LM cost and a sharp decrease in query accuracy (in all three datasets) when is increased from 2 to 3.
We obtained better results on the synthetic datasets compared to the real dataset. We believe that this is caused by the fact that the real dataset is more sparse (e.g., there are 5,000 unique courses, some of which are taken by very few students) and has more variance (e.g., some students took only 1 to 2 courses, whereas others took 60-70). In contrast, the synthetic datasets are more evenly distributed, for example, all students are CS majors that take around the same number of courses, most of which are courses in Computer Science or related areas. Also, we obtain roughly 10-15% better results on syntheticS compared to syntheticT. The probable cause for this is the division of courses into college years in syntheticT. For example, consider two students S1 and S2 who take the elective course EL101, but S1 takes EL101 in her freshman year, whereas S2 takes EL101 in her senior year. Unless diversify decides to match S1's freshman year with S2's senior year (which is a small probability, assuming S1's freshman courses are more similar to S2's freshman courses rather than her senior courses), the EL101 vertices will not be matched with each other. Instead, they will be matched with other courses or suppressed, due to the top-down nature of diversify. The syntheticS dataset does not suffer from this problem, since courses are directly children of the root vertices and are not divided into college years.
We also would like to study the effects of our heuristics by comparing (1) ClusTree versus CToff to validate that our clustering heuristic is useful and (2) LSAP versus GRD to validate the effect of using an optimal solution against a greedy solution. In most experiments, we see that ClusTree outperforms CToff and LSAP outperforms GRD, as expected. The difference between LSAP and GRD is usually more evident when is large, apart from the = 4 case on the real dataset, since most of the data in this experiment are destroyed no matter which algorithm is used. Also, although our LSAP approach provides an optimal solution to the subtree matching problem, neither ClusTree nor CToff guarantee optimality in the clustering phase-as in any clustering algorithm. Therefore, we cannot claim that ClusTree-LSAP or CToff-LSAP are optimal or they should outperform their greedy counterparts in all experiments. In most experiments they do, which is intuitive, but there are also a few cases where the GRD approach performs almost as good as or somewhat better than LSAP. This happens often when is small, and particularly in the KL-divergence experiment on the synthetic dataset.
With regard to efficiency, we obtained the execution times in Figure 13 on syntheticS. This dataset contains 1,000 hierarchical data records (with height = 3) and a total of approximately 42,000 vertices. CToff is significantly faster than ClusTree, since it performs a single pass over the data. For all values, it took 2 to 3 min to run CToff-GRD and 3 to 4 min to run CToff-LSAP. Since ClusTree performs multiple passes over the data (with increasing χ ), it turns out to be roughly 10-15 times slower than CToff . The differences between execution times become more significant as is increased. All of these results are in line with our complexity analyses.
Finally, we emphasize the tradeoffs between data utility and efficiency. The choice of using ClusTree over CToff and LSAP over GRD both increase data utility but come at the cost of increased execution time. On average, the best-performing algorithm (in terms of query accuracy and LM cost) is ClusTree-LSAP, which also happens to be the slowest.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we investigated the problem of privacy in hierarchical data publishing. We discussed how popular privacy notions such as k-anonymity and -diversity can be applied to hierarchical data. We designed an algorithm that produces -diverse anonymizations of collections of hierarchical data records. Our algorithm is independent of the domains and generalization hierarchies of attributes and the anonymization cost metric used. Even though we use the LM metric in this article, our approach is suitable for other monotonic cost metrics. For example, one can use a metric that penalizes certain levels in the hierarchical schema more than others (e.g., to apply more emphasis on courses than evaluations). Other domain-specific heuristics can also be employed. To fight sparsity of high-dimensional data and provide flexibility, our solution uses local recoding. We also address negative knowledge as well as positive knowledge: For every piece of information an adversary has (e.g., student has taken course X and/or has not taken course Y ), there are at least records in the anonymized output that fit this description. Therefore, the adversary's confidence regarding a particular sensitive value of his victim is always bounded by 1/ .
There are also certain limitations of our approach. For example, if all records in an equivalence class contain the letter grade A for different courses, an adversary may learn with probability > 1/ that his victim has received an A from some course, even though he cannot be certain which course it was. In certain cases, such disclosures might be unacceptable, for example, an adversary learns that his victim has AIDS from an anonymized medical dataset. To aid this problem, one can easily extend our algorithm to prohibit certain sensitive values from appearing multiple times in a class representative.
There exist several directions for future work. First, our anonymization strategy does not allow adding noise to the output. One could try to see whether data utility can be improved by adding noise and counterfeits. Second, different definitions of privacy (e.g., differential privacy [Dwork 2008 ] that relies on noise addition) can be applied to hierarchical data. Third, there are numerous tools and engines that process hierarchical data. In particular, XML streams and query engines are widely used in today's world. An interesting area of research is how our definitions of privacy can be applied in these contexts (e.g., XML data streams) [Zhou et al. 2009 ].
